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Three field experiments coupled the clinical psychology concept of validation with Elaboration 
Likelihood Model-Heuristic-Systematic Model theorizing to increase the influence of persua­
sive messages on aluminum can recycling. Signs that validated students’ complaints that alumi­
num can recycling was inconvenient, but persuaded them to recycle anyhow (validate-per- 
suade) were expected to reduce reactance, increase scrutiny and cognitive elaboration, and 
result in longer term behavior change. Across these 3 experiments, signs influenced recycling 
relative to baseline; a persuasive message was more influential than convenience; and clinical 
validation received support as a way to increase message scrutiny, cognitive elaboration, and 
sustained behavior change.
Implementing recycling programs can provide financial 
benefits to the setting while simultaneously reducing the 
volume of waste and contributing to a recycling ethic. How­
ever, in public settings with many visitors or much turn­
over, it may be difficult to convince people that recycling 
should be done and difficult to teach them how and where 
to recycle. This series of experiments suggests that using ef­
fectively placed and developed signs can increase participa­
tion in recycling programs. Experiment 1 used combina­
tions of environmental convenience and persuasive 
messages to increase recycling. Experiment 2 began to ex­
plore the possibility of using signs to increase cognitive 
elaboration, thereby potentially increasing attitude strength 
and chances of internalized recycling. Experiment 3 aimed 
to connect newly elaborated cognitions with sustained recy­
cling, that is, recycling after signs had been removed. The 
atmosphere at the research site has been favorable toward 
recycling, but recycling rates have been low. Thus, we con-
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strue our project as having two goals: effecting modest lev­
els of persuasion that convince people to begin recycling, 
and increasing the connection between attitudes and behav­
ior. The research has less to say about creating new atti­
tudes or persuading those who strongly oppose recycling.
The messages were developed using models of persua­
sion that have produced robust findings in laboratory and 
applied research. An implication ofthe  models is that signs 
can have short- or long-term impacts on behavior. 
Short-term signs are often prompts that give simple direc­
tions. They allow people to react automatically, without a 
great deal of thought and with little or no change in 
thoughts or knowledge about the issue (cf. Werner, Rhodes, 
& Partain, 1998). Long-term signs get people to think 
about and remember the message and be more thoughtful in 
their behavioral response. This deeper processing should 
result in stronger, more accessible attitudes, and more en­
during behavior change (Fazio, 1990, 1995; Petty, 
Haugvedt, & Smith, 1995).
This distinction has been developed in Petty and 
Cacioppo’s (1986a, 1986b; Petty, 1994) Elaboration Likeli­
hood Model (ELM) and in Chaiken’s (1987) Heuristic-Sys­
tematic Model (HSM). Both models describe these two routes 
to persuasion. Petty andCacioppo (1986a, 1986b) described 
the first as the “peripheral route” and contrasted it with the 
“central” or thoughtful route; Chaiken (1987) labels these 
“heuristic” and “systematic” processing, respectively. Al­
though there are some differences between the two theories 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Petty, 1994) 
within the confines of this research, we treat them as essen­
tially similar, and will use terms from the ELM because of its
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closer ties to Greenwald's (1968) and Brock's (1967) early 
work on counterarguing and persuasion.
Both ELM and HSM theorists propose that people are 
more likely to scrutinize a message when they have the mo­
tivation and the ability to do so. For the most part, research­
ers have manipulated motivation when devising ways of 
increasing or decreasing message scrutiny (cf. Petty, Wells, 
& Brock, 1976; White & Harkins, 1994, on distraction as 
an ability impedance). These experimental manipulations 
generally increase the recipient's psychological involve­
ment, such as convincing participants they will be affected 
by a policy change proposed in the persuasive message, 
telling them they will need to discuss the persuasive mes­
sage with an experimenter, leading them to believe there 
are real consequences for their judgments, among other 
strategies. (For a discussion of what involvement means, 
see Johnson & Eagly, 1989, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; 
for other ways of increasing scrutiny, see Petty, Haugvedt, 
& Smith, 1995, and Petty, 1994.)
This research explores an alternative way of increasing 
message scrutiny— clinical validation of recipients' com­
plaints about the behavior. Although it may seem counter­
productive to agree with an audience's negative voice, 
clinical psychologists and communication researchers 
have long argued that people want to feel understood and 
that feeling understood reduces reactance, hostility, and 
defensiveness, and leaves people open to new ideas (Alex­
ander & Parsons, 1982; Coates & Wortman, 1980; Coyne, 
1985, p. 344; Rogers, 1951). Rogers (1951) suggested that 
before psychological improvement could occur, clients 
seeking counseling needed to feel as though the therapist 
understood and accepted their distress. More recently, 
clinical psychologists have expressed a similar theme 
(Hatfield, 1987; Kraus & Redman, 1986; Wikler, Wasow,
& Hatfield, 1981). The basic clinical premise is that until 
individuals feel affirmed or validated, they respond defen­
sively to suggestions that they need to change their way of 
thinking or behaving. In a particularly compelling exam­
ple, Kraus and Redman (1986) suggested that denying the 
legitimacy of a client's postpartum depression only wors­
ened the problem. They suggested instead, pointing out 
that the individual's depression was perfectly understand­
able under the circumstances (clinical validation), but that 
the depression was interfering with her other responsibili­
ties and relationships (persuasive reason for trying to 
come out of the depression).
Validation is also emerging as a central factor in effec­
tive family and marital communication. Gottman's (1979) 
work showed that in nondistressed couples, individuals val­
idate and sympathize with the partner's complaints; there is 
often a cycle of complaining by one partner followed by 
understanding and sympathy by the other, and ultimately 
better understanding on both sides. In contrast, in distressed 
couples, “cross-complaining” occurs. One partner's com­
plaint is often followed by a complaint from the other that
is matched by the first, with neither side listening to the 
other, and hostility often increasing with eveiy exchange.
In the domain of customer complaints, anecdotal and re­
search evidence also supports validation as a way to reduce 
defensiveness, maintain positive customer relations, and in­
crease satisfaction with the problem 's resolution. Managers 
report that customers are more satisfied with their treatment 
if customer service representatives spend time validating 
complaints before beginning to attempt remediation. In 
contrast, if the service representative fails to apologize or to 
really “hear” the customer's problem, the exchange can es­
calate to the point where the problem is unresolvable 
(Blodgett, Granbois, & Walters, 1993; Furlong, 1993; 
Kelley, 1993).
This array of studies suggests a persuasive recycling 
message may be more effective if it acknowledges recipi­
ents' reasons for not recycling than if it takes a hard-line, 
persuasive approach. It suggests that validation could oper­
ate by increasing motivation (viz, “willingness to listen”) as 
well as ability (by reducing stress and hostility that may im­
pair' cognitive functioning— although our signs are not de­
signed to produce such extreme levels of reactance). 
Research in littering, antipollution, and sales indicated that 
softer, or more polite approaches were more effective than 
reactance engendering “hard sells” (see Brehm & Brehm, 
1981, for summary). As another example, warning recipi­
ents about an upcoming persuasive attempt can reduce mes­
sage impact because it arouses reactance and elicits 
counterarguing (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a). We 
adopted Kraus and Redman's (1986) suggestion, and hy­
pothesized that we could reduce potential reactance while 
increasing acceptance through a combination of validation 
and persuasion—reassurance that one's perspective is valid 
with provision of a reason for change.
Questions about validation's impact are raised in all three 
of these experiments. The first experiment compares the per­
suasive impact of a validated message, a counterarguing mes­
sage, and three levels of recycling convenience, and asks 
whether an effective message can overcome inconvenience. 
The second and third experiments use a standard ELM-HSM 
paradigm to ask whether validation functions like other vari­
ables known to increase message scrutiny.
EXPERIMENT 1 
Theoretical Background
The first experiment evaluates two kinds of persuasive mes­
sages; one designed to increase receptivity to the message by 
first validating and then persuading students to ignore their 
complaint about inconvenience, the other to increase persua­
sive impact by counterarguing against the students' com­
plaint that recycling is inconvenient. These persuasive mes­
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sages were compared with manipulated levels of recycling 
convenience, a situational variable thought to be essential in 
successful recycling programs (Geller, Winett, & Everett, 
1982), and the focus of the students’ complaints.
P ersuasion  a n d  Counterarguing
Validation is thought to enhance a message’s impact by in­
creasing the recipient’s scrutiny of the message. An alterna­
tive persuasive strategy is to undermine a recipient’s 
counterarguments. That is, there is a long history of research 
suggesting that effective counterarguing is one’s best de­
fense against persuasion. McGuire’s (1964) work on inocu­
lation showed that a weak attack on one’s beliefs reduced the 
impact of a subsequent stronger attack because the weak at­
tack stimulated people to develop or learn counterarguments. 
Similarly, Greenwald (1968) and Brock (1967) measured 
cognitions in response to persuasive messages and found that 
people who simply reiterated a message tended to be per­
suaded by it, whereas those who refuted the message or oth­
erwise argued against it tended to resist persuasion. The 
ELM supports the view that counterarguing (or negative 
elaboration) leads to resistance, whereas positive elaboration 
leads to persuasion (e.g., see Petty et al„ 1976). An implica­
tion is that one way to persuade people is to anticipate and re­
fute their counterarguments. Thus, as a complement to 
ELM -HSM  methodology, in which weak and strong argu­
ments are prescaled and presented to participants (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986a), our counterarguing approach will identify 
recipients’ major reason for rejecting a message and refute 
that reason. In essence, instead of validating participants’ 
complaint, this strategy would reject it.
In this research, to ascertain typical counterarguments, 
we interviewed students in the buildings chosen as research 
sites. The overwhelming reason given for not recycling alu­
minum cans was that students did not want to go out of 
their way to find or use the recycling bin; specific explana­
tions included, “I’m in a hurry” and “don’t want to find a 
[can] crasher.” Our persuasive message designed to counter 
this complaint was simply “It only takes 30 seconds.”
C onven ience  a n d  R ecycling
Consistent with students’ complaints, a number of research­
ers have demonstrated that increasing convenience is an ef­
fective way to increase recycling (e.g., Geller, Winett, & 
Everett, 1982 described studies of proximity and multiple 
containers, two ways of increasing convenience). Hormuth, 
Katzenstein, Bruch, and Ringenberger (1993) developed this 
idea more fully by grounding it in Behavior Setting Theory’s 
concept of natural streams of behavior. Hormuth et al. (1993) 
suggested that recyclers and recycling managers too often re­
move recycling from the place where the recyclable product
is used. This makes recycling more difficult because it be­
comes a separate behavior rather than being incorporated as a 
natural and habitual part of the total consumption-disposal 
process. In this case, students drink a soda during class and 
then throw the aluminum can away as they leave the room on 
their way to another class, lunch, work, and so on. Discarding 
the can becomes a natural part of consumption.
According to the behavior stream approach, the opti­
mum strategy for ensuring that recycling replaces disposal 
is to provide a recycling container either next to the gar­
bage can or on the student’s route to the next class. Using 
this idea, we manipulated convenience by varying how 
close recycling bins were to students’ travel routes. 
(Whereas providing small containers in each classroom is 
most convenient, it is expensive and requires that someone 
collect and crash the cans, a cost that our university was 
unwilling to absorb.)
C onven ience  V ersus P ersuasion
Research on “mindless” cooperation has shown that making 
a request and providing a reason is more effective than just 
making the request, in theory because the reason fulfills the 
target individual’s expectations for how requests should be 
made (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). This suggests 
that signs with persuasive messages that justify the recycling 
instruction should be more effective than simple prompts 
(even though a prompt may be effective, and may increase 
recycling relative to baseline).
S u m m a ry
In summary, Experiment 1 had four hypotheses and one 
question: (a) Signs can effect increases in recycling; (b) in­
creasing convenience will increase recycling; (c) a (low cost) 
persuasive message is more effective than (high cost) conve­
nience for increasing recycling; (d) with similar levels of 
convenience, a persuasive message is more effective than a 
prompt for increasing recycling; and (e) is validation-per- 
suasion more effective than counterarguing as a strategy for 
behavior change?
Method 
Selec tion  o f Buildings
After 2 weeks of observation and data collection in 12 
buildings on the university campus, we selected five build­
ings to serve as research sites. Criteria for inclusion were 
that the building had (a) a minimum of 6 classrooms in use, 
(b) a vending machine providing sodas and juices in alumi­
num cans, (c) a can crusher for recycling, (d) no other ongo­
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ing recycling program, (e) evidence of large soda-juice 
sales, and (f) a variety of course topics being taught in the 
building so that our manipulated treatments would not be 
confounded with type of course or particular student major. 
This study was conducted during the spring quarter, be­
tween March and June.
Preliminary S u rvey
As noted previously, a brief survey provided information 
about students’ primary reasons for not recycling so that ap­
propriate counterarguing and validation messages could be 
devised to undermine those reasons. Small numbers of stu­
dents in each building (total n = 50) were interviewed about 
why they did or did not recycle.
Experim ental Conditions
The design was a 2 (time: baseline-treatment) x 5 (treat­
ment) factorial: the treatments included three levels of con­
venience (low-moderate-high) and two different messages 
(counterarguing-validate persuade). The “no signs” baseline 
lasted 1 week, and treatment lasted 3 weeks.
C onvenience. Because of fire codes that limit sizes 
and locations of recycling bins, we could only achieve certain 
levels of convenience (low & high) in two particular build­
ings: the remaining treatments (moderate convenience and 
the two persuasive messages) were randomly assigned to the 
remaining buildings. Low convenience was achieved by 
placing two recycling bins in a room away from the regular 
traffic flow. Moderate convenience meant leaving only one 
recycling bin near a major exit at one end of a building: thus it 
was in the “stream of behavior” for many students, but out of 
the way for many others. In addition, high convenience was 
achieved by putting recycling bins at major exits on two 
floors (two bins total), thereby increasing the number of stu­
dents who would naturally pass by on their way to and from 
class. Bright gold “prompt” signs on each wastebasket in the 
classrooms and adjacent hallways said “no aluminum cans, 
please” and directed students to the recycling container. The 
signs themselves represented a major change in all 5 experi­
mental buildings and could account for changes even in the 
low convenience condition. Compared to preexisting condi­
tions, the actual physical changes were: low convenience, 
adding one bin: high convenience, adding one bin to a new 
floor: moderate convenience: and no physical changes.
Persuasion. In both buildings with persuasive signs, 
the recycling bin was located so as to achieve a moderate level 
of convenience: no changes in bin location were needed.
No Aluminum Cans Please!!!!!
Use the Recycler Located on the First Floor, Near the Entrance 
It May Be Inconvenient 
But It Is Important!!!!!!!!!!!
FIGURE 1 The validation-im portant” sign.
Bright gold “persuasive” signs on all wastebaskets had the 
same basic information as signs in the convenience condi­
tions, including the location of the recycling bin. Each also 
contained a final persuasive message: the one counterarguing 
against student complaints added, “it only takes 30 seconds” 
and the other, using a validation-persuasion approach had the 
message “it may be inconvenient but it is important.” As an 
example, the validation-persuasion sign that appeared is 
shown in Figure 1.
Data Collection a n d  A na lysis
Two different experimenters counted the aluminum cans in 
different buildings at the end of each weekday. They counted 
the cans in wastebaskets in each classroom and in the hall­
ways, and the cans in the can crusher(s). In most cases, alu­
minum cans were easily located in the trash and accurate 
counts were easily achieved. To further assure valid data, the 
importance of accuracy was stressed and data collectors ex­
pected their counts to be checked. Although no reliability 
data were collected in this experiment, they were collected in 
four other identical studies, and rs were consistently found to 
be above .90. To enhance the experiment’s ecological valid­
ity, any discarded cans were left in wastebaskets for the cus­
todians, who emptied the cans every morning.
For data analysis, the average daily number of alumi­
num cans found in each classroom was divided by the total 
estimated to have come from that room2 to compute the 
proportion that had been discarded. Each classroom was the 
unit of analysis, and the condition mean was an average 
across these proportions. Wastebaskets in the adjacent hall­
ways were treated as a single room. Thus, the number of 
classrooms plus one hallway in each building became the n
2The equation was MD/(MD + MR) for each classroom, where MD = 
mean per day in garbage and MR = mean per day in recycler estimated to be 
from that room. Means per day were used to avoid problems of missing data 
(e.g., if  a class were in session or a door were locked). For MR, we assumed 
that the cans in the crusher came equally from each classroom. Thus, if there 
was a daily average o f 100 cans in the crusher and 10 rooms in the building, 
MR for that day would be 10 for each room. Given the different classroom 
sizes and different distances to the can crusher, this assumption may not be 
entirely valid but is less subjective than attempting to devise a separate ad­
justm ent for each classroom.
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for each treatment condition. This strategy was chosen in­
stead of treating the whole building as the unit of analysis 
for several interrelated reasons. First, classrooms are the 
natural social setting, with classes meeting regularly, con­
taining the same students, and many people regularly con­
suming a drink during class. Second, averaging across 
proportions in the classrooms is conservative, requiring that 
the persuasive signs have similar impacts in multiple 
rooms, rather than a strong impact in only part of the build­
ing (such as a large, environmentally oriented class). Third, 
by similar reasoning, this approach provides a check on so­
cial pressures or modeling of recycling. If these social pro­
cesses contributed to recycling rates, they would need to do 
so in many rooms to impact the building's mean recycling 
rate. A potential problem is that classrooms may not be in­
dependent— some students may have more than one class 
in the building and use more than one aluminum can per 
day, or their recycling behavior may be influenced by oth­
ers, resulting in a dependency between these scores.
Results
For clarity, results are presented as percentage of cans recy­
cled rather than percentage thrown away. For convenience 
and clarity, the data were averaged across the 3 treatment 
weeks with signs in place, and these data were analyzed us­
ing a 5 (condition) x 2 (time: baseline-treatment) between 
and within participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). Be­
cause of significant differences between conditions at base­
line, an analysis of covariance was used to test for treatment 
effects; the covariate, baseline recycling was homogeneous 
across conditions, covariate by treatment interaction, F(4, 
53) = 1.14, MSE= 93.53, p > .05, partial i f  = .08. Table 1 
presents baseline means and the raw and adjusted treatment 
means (Winer, 1962, p. 604) averaged across the 3 treatment 
weeks. Specific hypotheses were tested using planned t tests 
for disparate ns (Bruning & Kintz, 1987).
Overall Im pact o f Interventions
The first hypothesis was that all conditions would result in 
increased recycling; this hypothesis was supported by an 
overall main effect for time, F(1,58) = 313.69, MSE= 80.95, 
p < .001, partial T)2 = .84, as well as by the separate planned t 
tests for each condition (see Table 1 & Figure 2). Figure 2 
presents the weekly results for each building to show the de­
gree of consistency over time, the typical pattern in this series 
of studies.
Increasing C onven ience
The next hypothesis was that increasing convenience would 
result in increased recycling (see Table 1, column 3, ad­
justed means). Controlling for baseline, there was a signifi­
cant effect of treatment, F(4, 57) = 7.08, MSE = 94.43, p < 
.001, partial r)2 = .33, and a priori tests indicated that putt­
ing a recycler at two convenient locations resulted in signif­
icantly more recycling than either the low or moderate con­
venience arrangement; these latter two conditions did not 
differ from one another.
P ersuasive  S ig n s V ersus C onven ience
The third and fourth hypotheses compared persuasive mes­
sages with convenience. One hypothesis was that each per­
suasive sign would have more impact than any of the conve­
nience conditions. This hypothesis was supported for the 
validate-persuade (“inconvenient but important”) condition 
and was partially supported for the counterarguing (“30 sec­
onds”) condition. As shown in Table 1, column 3, when the 
persuasive message was “inconvenient but important,” the 
average rate of recycling was 80% across the 3 weeks, sub­
stantially higher than the means for all of the convenience 
conditions. The “30 seconds” sign resulted in a high rate of 
recycling (68%) that was significantly higher than both the 
low and moderate convenience conditions, although it was
TABLE 1








M eans Adjusted 
fo r  Baseline
Low convenience 45.3 62.0* 58.3,, (n = 9)
Moderate convenience 30.4 58.2* 61.1a (/; = 16)
High convenience 34.4 70.2* 7 I.3 „ (h = 11)
"30 seconds” 39.0 69.0* 68.1b (>i = 20)
"Inconvenient but important” 38.8 80.9* 80,1 c (n = 7)
Note, ms indicate the num ber of classrooms in the building. In column 2, *s indicate the increase of signs 
over no signs (baseline) by a priori, one-tailed /-tests at p  < .05. In column 3, percentages with different subscripts 
differ at p  < .05; all but the comparison between the two persuasive signs are one-tailed.
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FIGURE 2 Percentage o f cans recycled during baseline and treat­
ment, Lxperiment 1.
not different from the condition in which recycling bins were 
most conveniently located.
Another way of comparing a persuasive message with con­
venience is to select groups with similar convenience (in this 
case, moderate convenience), and hypothesize that each per­
suasive sign would have more impact than the “prompt,” or 
simple instruction to recycle. As noted previously, both per­
suasive messages produced significantly more recycling than 
the prompt-moderate convenience condition.
“30  S e c o n d s ” 
Im portant”
V ersus “Inconvenien t But
An a priori, two-tailed test indicated that the validate-per- 
suade sign (“inconvenient but important”) was signifi­
cantly more influential than the sign that counterargued 
(“30 seconds”).
way to increase recycling; however, this level of conve­
nience was not economically viable in our setting. Recycling 
in response to the persuasive signs also support our view that 
although convenience is important, in settings where it can­
not be provided, persuasive signs can be very effective at in­
creasing recycling. Thus, although it may be important to 
embed recycling into the ongoing stream of behavior, that 
stream can include going to out-of-the-way places if a sign 
invokes sufficient impetus to do so. As suggested by clinical, 
communications, and other work, an effective sign was one 
that validated participants’ complaints that recycling was in­
convenient and then persuaded them to recycle anyhow. This 
sign was more effective than one that counterargued against 
students’ concerns—although the latter sign was effective.
An alternative explanation of our signs’ effectiveness is 
increased awareness of recycling, or a “Hawthorne” effect 
(positive response to any change). This is the simplest ex­
planation for the increase over baseline in the low and mod­
erate convenience conditions where large numbers of signs 
(without any substantial change in convenience) yielded 
significant increases in recycling relative to baseline. How­
ever, note that both persuasion conditions yielded signifi­
cantly higher recycling rates than did the low and moderate 
convenience conditions. These findings increase our confi­
dence that the persuasive signs provided something more 
than simple awareness of the recycling bins or the univer­
sity’ s interest in recycling.
One problem with the two persuasive signs is that the 
type of persuasive message was confounded with valida­
tion. If “it is important” is more influential than “it only 
takes 30 seconds,” that could explain their differential ef­
fectiveness. That is, what we have called a counterargu­
ment could also be viewed as a persuasive message. 
Experiment 1, then, contained a confound, with one persua­
sive message not validated, and the other validated. The 
purpose of the next experiment was to uncouple validation 
and message. An additional purpose was to link behaviors 
with cognitive responses to the signs. As noted earlier, 
ELM-HSM theorizing suggests that messages can influ­
ence attitudes—and by implication, behaviors—via either 
central or peripheral routes. Peripheral route persuasion 
should not be bolstered by cognitions, whereas central 
route influence should be. If validation increases cognitive 
processing and the message being processed is strong, it 




This experiment examined the impacts of convenience and 
persuasion and showed that both could affect recycling. The 
results indicated that increasing convenience is an effective
Experiment 2 used a factorial design to cross validation 
(no-yes) with type of persuasive message (“it only takes 30 
seconds,” ”it is important”) during 2 time periods (base- 
line-signs in place). We collected both behavioral and ques­
tionnaire data to estimate the relation between cognitive
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elaboration and behavior change. In addition to an expected 
main effect for time on recycling behavior, we hypothesized 
main effects for validation such that validation would result 
in higher levels of recycling as well as higher levels of cogni­
tive support. We used prescaling to ascertain whether the two 
messages were equally persuasive, and expected that validat­
ing strong messages would increase their influence (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).
Method
The basic methodology replicated that of Experiment 1: con­
ditions were randomly assigned to building; recycling bins 
were located so as to achieve moderate levels of convenience; 
basic messages on the sign were the same; data collection was 
identical to that of Experiment 1; and data analysis was simi­
lar, using a combination of repeated measures, analysis of 
covariance, and planned t tests to evaluate specific hypothe­
ses. A reliability check on the numbers o f cans yielded a reli­
ability coefficient o f.99 (agreement on all but 2 containers).
The experiment was conducted during summer quarter, 
approximately 1 month after removal of the Experiment 1 
signs. Because of low student enrollments and high mainte­
nance and construction activity, only four suitable buildings 
could be located for this project. Three of the buildings had 
been used in Experiment 1 (see Table 2 for details), and all 
met the building selection criteria detailed in Experiment 1.
Experim ental D esign
The design was a 2 (validation: no-yes) x 2 (persuasive mes­
sage: “it only takes 30 seconds” , “it is important”) x 2 (time: 
baseline-treatment) between and within participants facto­
rial. Baseline data were gathered for 1 week, and the treat­
ment period lasted 3 weeks.
P ersuasive  M e ssa g e s
As a check on whether the two messages were comparable in 
persuasiveness, they were embedded in a list of similar signs 
and rated by Introductory Psychology students in a different 
quarter and in a classroom away from the experimental build­
ings (total n = 262, although not all students completed all 
items). Students were told to imagine that they had an alumi­
num can and were about to discard it when they saw a sign en­
couraging them to recycle it; all students rated 9 different 
signs. On a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (/ would definitely 
toss) to 5 (I would definitely recycle), the mean for “it only 
takes 30 seconds” was 3.92 and that for “it is important” was 
3.79, F( 1,256) = 5.87, MSE= 0.36, p < .016, partial i f  = .02; 
although significant, the 0.13 unit difference was too small to 
be considered meaningful for our purposes. On a scale ranging 
from 1 (extremely negative influence [on my opinion about re­
cycling the can]) to 5 (extremely positive influence), the mean 
for the “30 seconds” sign was 3.69 and for the “important” sign 
was 3.75, F( 1,255) = 1.02, MSE = 0.49,p > .05, partial i f  = 
.00. All means were above the neutral point, indicating partici­
pants expected the two messages to have similar positive in­
fluences on their opinions and behavior.
Q uestionnaires
Questionnaires were administered during the final week of 
the quarter, after the signs had been removed for 4 days. The 
rationale is similar to using a survey to test opinions about 
any publicized or advertised issue. If our signs have an im­
pact on people, we should be able to detect that impact by 
surveying a sample drawn randomly from each building.
Two to three experimenters worked in each building. We 
determined the optimum time and day to administer the ques­
tionnaire for each building by reviewing the class schedule 
and selecting a time with the highest number and diversity of 
classes; for three of the buildings, this was on the same day at
TABLE 2









Adjusted fo r  
Baseline
"It is important” 58.3 74.4* 71.7 (n = 20)“
"Inconvenient but important” 66.8 75.0** 67.2 (/; = 11 )b
"Only 30 seconds” 49.7 65.0* 67.4 (n = 16)c
"Inconvenient but only 30 seconds” 29.2 56.1 * 70.6 (n = 7)d
M 53.7 69.4*
Note. «s indicated number of rooms in that building. In column 2, symbols indicate an increase of treatment over 
baseline by a priori, one-tailed, /-test: *p < .05. < .1 0 . Adjusted means (column 3) do not differ from one another.
“Condition-recycling in i;1 = 30 seconds; baseline = 39.0%, treatment = 69.0%. '’Condition-recycling in i;1 = High 
convenience; baseline = 34.4%, treatment = 70.2%. C ondition-recycling in i;1 = Moderate convenience; baseline = 
30.4%, treatment = 58.2%. dNot used in i;1 .
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approximately the same time, and for the fourth, it was the fol­
lowing day at approximately the same time of day. Because the 
summer session provided a small number of potential partici­
pants, we attempted to draw a 100% sample in each building 
by asking every person we saw to “help us with a class project 
and fill out this questionnaire.” By appealing to their support 
of a fellow student's project, we deemphasized the particular 
content of the questionnaire and were able to include people 
who supported and did not support recycling. Most people 
agreed or refused without asking the nature of the question­
naire. The most typical reason for refusing was that the student 
was on the way to work or to another class across campus; a 
small number of participants said “I just did that inbuilding X” 
and were not counted as refusers.3 Although we sampled ev­
eryone, results include only people with a class or office in the 
building to assure they had had opportunities to read our signs. 
Sixty-two percent of these participants were female.
We took great care to distance ourselves from the signs 
so that responses to the questionnaire would be independ­
ent. On the first and last days of treatment, we posted and 
removed the signs early in the morning before students ar­
rived on campus; during the project, we gathered recycling 
data late in the afternoon, when most students had left cam­
pus; and although there was some overlap in duties, for the 
most part, different people gathered recycling data and ad­
ministered the questionnaires.
Respondents used 7-point scales to indicate their an­
swers. Three questions probed the perceived convenience 
emphasized by the “it only takes 30 seconds” sign. These 
items tapped how accessible the can crusher was (time to 
get there, convenient to get there, and ease of use). These 
items did not form an adequate scale (Cronbach's a  = .59) 
and were analyzed separately. Two questions probed reac­
tions to the “it is important” sign: one simply asked “how 
important is it to recycle aluminum cans?” ranging from 1 
(extremely unimportant) to 7 (extremely important). The 
other was an open-ended question asking them to explain 
their answer to the “importance” question, listing “as many 
reasons as you can” . Responses to the open-ended question 
were analyzed in three ways. First we counted the number 
of different reasons for the importance of recycling, regard­
less of their quality (consistent with the idea that people se­
lect reasons they themselves find compelling; McGuire, 
1964; Greenwald, 1968). Second, to reduce the skew in 
these data and increase confidence in the results, we con­
verted these scores to a simple index of whether the person 
had given any positive reasons. Counts of distinct reasons 
were provided by a single coder, with reliabilities provided 
by two additional coders, each counting half of the ques­
tionnaires; all condition information was removed for these 
counts and responses from different conditions mixed to-
•Mixperimenters recorded refusals but the original data were lost; experi­
menters recalled few refusals (8—15 refusals-buildings, or 14%—25%).
gether. Reliabilities on the counts were r = .91 and .94 for 
the separate raters, and .93 overall.
Third, we used content analyses to indicate the presence 
or absence of strong, external, and weak reasons. Catego­
ries for the content analyses were developed and refined in 
a multistep process. We began with the four substantive 
reasons for recycling aluminum cans, and called these 
strong environmental reasons: extends life of landfill, re­
uses natural resource, uses less energy compared to mining, 
and reduces the need to disturb environment through min­
ing. Some weak environmental reasons emerged as we read 
participants' answers: “for the environment,” “they care 
about the environment,” and “to recycle.” A final cluster of 
reasons emphasized external motivators such as “for the 
money,” “politically correct,” “social pressure,” “conve­
nience of recycling bins,” and “to keep the building clean” . 
One person categorized all responses into these three cate­
gories, and a second categorized a randomly selected 25%. 
Kappa coefficients on these ratings were .95 for the strong 
environmental reasons (98% agreement), .82 for the weak 
environmental reasons (93% agreement), and .77 for the 
external reasons (90% agreement). Only 5 people gave neg­
ative reasons so these were not analyzed. We used category 
present-absent instead of actual counts to reduce skew 
(only a few people gave more than one reason per category, 
which produced considerable skew in these counts).
A final question asked respondents to estimate the per­
centage of people who did recycle the cans they used in this 
building as a check on whether students perceived differen­
tial recycling norms across the buildings.4
R esults 
R ecycling  R a te s
Overall im pact o f interventions. The first hypothesis 
was that all conditions would result in increased recycling; 
this hypothesis was supported by an overall main effect for 
time, F(1, 50) = 41.23, MSE = 154.77,/? < .001, partial r)2 = 
.45, as well as by the separate planned t tests for each condi­
tion, except for the “inconvenient but important” condition, 
which showed a marginally significant increase (see Table 2; 
for a  = .05, the critical difference was 8.9, whereas the ob­
tained difference was 8.1). Note also that although the final 
rate of recycling was quite high in that group (unadjusted re­
cycling = 75.0%), the high baseline (66.8%) made it difficult 
to effect a substantial increase in recycling.
4There was little overlap among these items. Lxaminadon of the residual 
correlation matrix (with “number o f reasons" representing the open-ended 
responses) indicated that rs(62) ranged from .01 to .32, w>ith4 of the 5 signifi­
cant correlations involving “convenience."
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Treatm ent e ffects. As in Experiment 1, the covariate 
(baseline recycling) contributed significant variance, F (l,
49) = 51.56, MSE = 226.96, p < .001, partial i f  = .51, and 
was homogeneous across conditions, heterogeneity F( 1,48) 
= 0.05, MSE = 231.46, p > .05, partial i f  = .00. The 2 (mes­
sage) x 2 (validation) analysis of covariance on recycling 
rates indicated that once the covariate was removed, there 
were no significant main or interactive effects due to the 
different signs, all F s(l, 49) < .71, MSE = 226.96, ps > .05, 
partial rps < .01 (see Table 2). Although validation did not 
yield significant main or interactive effects, the obtained 
pattern could be consistent with ELM -HSM  theorizing, be­
cause both peripheral and central routes can have 
short-term impacts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). The 
more relevant question is whether validation increased 
elaboration, an indication of central route processing.
Q uestionnaire
The primary purpose of the questionnaire was to measure 
differential attitudinal and cognitive reactions to validation: 
Did validation increase scrutiny of the two messages? This 
question was addressed by comparing the same message 
with and without validation. A significant main effect for 
validation would indicate similar effects on both signs, and a 
significant validate by sign interaction would indicate differ­
ential impact. As shown in Table 3, the latter pattern was ob­
tained for both attitudes and cognitions.
Cognitions a n d  m e s s a g e  scrutiny. Table 3 shows 
that the combination of validation with “it is important” 
(compared to that message without validation) resulted in sig­
nificantly higher ratings of the importance of recycling and 
significantly more cognitions supporting recycling's impor­
tance. For these three variables (importance, number of rea­
sons, percent of respondents providing any reason), the over­
all validation by message interactions were significant, and 
planned one-tailed t tests indicated significant differences be­
tween the validated and nonvalidated “important” message; 
message by validation interaction Fs were as follows: recy­
cling important, F( 1,136) = 3.59, MSE = 2 A X p  < .06, partial 
i f  =".03; number of arguments, F( 1,138) = 6.24, MSE =0.96, 
p < .01, partial i f  = .04; percentage making any arguments, 
F( 1, 138) = 6.28, MSE = 0.20, p <".01, partial i f  = i)4.
In contrast to the “it is important” sign, validating the 
“30 seconds” message did not increase its impact on indi­
ces of persuasiveness. If anything, participants generated 
more arguments and were more likely to generate an argu­
ment when the sign was not validated, although the differ­
ences are not significant by two-tailed tests.
C onten t ana lyses. A 2 (message) x 2 (validation) x 3 
(type of reason) between and within participants ANOVA on 
the content analysis yielded a significant main effect for type 
of reason, F (2 ,276) = 9.43, MSE= 0.09 ,p < .001, partial i f  =
.07. Examination of the mean percentages indicated that peo­
ple used strong environmental reasons most, external 
motivators second, and weak environmental reasons 1 east fre­
quently. A significant message by validation interaction es­
sentially replicated the previous analyses on number of argu­
ments, F( 1,138) = 5.23, MSE= 0.18,/; < .02, partial i f  = .04. 
That is, validating “it is important” yielded more arguments, 
whereas validating “it only takes 30 seconds” yielded equal 
numbers of arguments compared to each sign's non validated 
counterpart. Type did not interact with the other factors, indi­
cating that the basic message by validation pattern occurred 
for all three kinds of reasons, F s(2 ,276) < 1.62, MSE= 0.09, 
ps > .05, partial i f  s < .01.
P erce ived  inconvenience. An additional purpose of 
the questionnaire was to provide checks on potential con­
founding factors. Using “it may be inconvenient” as valida­
tion may have had the undesired consequence of increasing 
perceptions that recycling was inconvenient. There was no 
evidence of this. Furthermore, coupling validation with the 
specific counterargument that recycling did not take a lot of 
time did not result in different ratings of the convenience of 
getting to or using the recycling bin. Indeed, means for the 
three questions measuring convenience did not differ, as indi-
TABLE 3
Impact of Validation on Attitudes and Cognitions, Experiment 2
Validation No Yes
Message: “It only takes 30 seconds"
Time 2.44 1.64
Convenient 5.84 5.87
Hasy use 6.00 6.25
Importance of recycling 6.04 5.68
Average number of positive arguments 0.58 0.35




W eak environmental 4 % 5%
Message: “It is important”
Time 2.30 2.04
Convenient 5.00 5.89
Hasy use 5.32 5.91
Importance of recycling 5.39 6.05*
Average number of positive arguments 0.34 0.95*




W eak environmental 8% 13%
Note. Items were measured on 7-point scales. The open-ended question 
followed the attitude item “How important is it to recycle?" and simply asked 
people to “Please explain your answer giving as many reasons as you can." 
Because of missing data, cell n ranges from 18 to 40. An asterisk indicates 
the two means in a row differ by one-tailed, a priori t tests.
*p < .05.
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cated by the lack of any significant main or interactive effects, 
"time to get to,” Fs( 1,89) < 2.36, MSE = 2.38,/?s > .05, partial 
r |2s < .03; "convenient to get to,” Fs(1, 93) < 1.94, MSE = 
3.37,/?s > .05, partial i f s  < .02; and "easy to use,” F( 1, 82) < 
2.22, MSE = 2.52, ps > .05, partial i f  s < .03 (see Table 3).
R ecycling  ethos. Another purpose of the question­
naire was to evaluate the extent to which a "recycling ethos” 
was emerging in the buildings in case that spirit might ac­
count for behavior change rather than our experimental 
signs. Participants’ average estimates of what percentage of 
people recycled aluminum cans ranged from 43% to 47% 
per building, and there were no differences due to treatments 
alone or in combination, all Fs(1, 111) < 0.24, MSE = 
468.16, ps > .05, partial r fs  < .00, suggesting that the build­
ings did not differ in their overt recycling spirit.
C arryover from E xperim ent 1. Approximately 4 weeks 
separated Experiment 2 from Experiment 1. Although we 
assumed that the new summer quarter would bring a new 
group of students to the buildings, the high baselines in Ex­
periment 2 suggested there may have been carryover. Three 
buildings were used in both experiments. As can be seen in 
the notes to Table 2, the one building not included in Ex­
periment 1 had a much lower baseline than the three previ­
ously used buildings. In these reused buildings, baseline re­
cycling had dropped from the Experiment 1 treatment 
levels by only 4% to 11% over the quarter break. Also, the 
new building had the highest increase in recycling once the 
signs were put in place. This information converges on the 
idea that there was carryover, even though almost 1 full 
month separated the two experiments. These high base 
rates may have attenuated the impact of three of our Exper­
iment 2 signs.
An important question is whether there was also cogni­
tive carryover. The "validate-important” building from Ex­
periment 1 was not used in Experiment 2, precluding 
concerns about cognitive carryover from that condition. 
None of the other signs from Experiment 1 deliberately in­
vited scrutiny, and would not be expected to increase cog­
nitive elaboration. Consistent with this, data from 
Experiment 2 show that cognitions in two of the reused 
buildings were similar to those in the single new building. 
The third reused building contained the validation or ’’im­
portant” sign, and as expected yielded the highest rates of 
cognitive elaboration and attitude change. This building 
had a "prompt” sign in Experiment 1. The overall pattern 
supports the idea that the cognitive data from Experiment 2 
were due to increased processing of the validate-"impor- 
tant” sign, and less likely due to cognitive carryover from 
Experiment 1 treatments.
This experiment replicated the finding of Experiment 1 that 
signs with persuasive messages increased recycling relative 
to baseline. We did not replicate the finding that validation 
coupled with "it is important” produced significantly higher 
levels of recycling relative to the same message without vali­
dation. We suspect that the high base rate may have damp­
ened this sign’s behavioral impact. Indeed, as noted previ­
ously, the final (unadjusted) recycling rate is quite high, 
almost as high as the 80% recycling achieved in the first ex­
periment. Note also that the adjusted recycling scores did not 
differ between this sign and the other three. Thus, the rela­
tively lower impact appeal's not to represent a decrease in this 
sign’s effectiveness, but rather occurred because of the high 
base rate and because the other signs yielded comparably 
high levels of recycling.
With respect to cognitive elaboration, this same message 
(validate-"important”) resulted in the highest levels of cog­
nitive elaboration, and we remain intrigued by the utility of 
validating someone’s concerns as a vehicle for increasing 
their scrutiny of and thinking about a message. Using "it 
may be inconvenient” as our particular form of validation 
did not appeal' to increase participants’ perceptions that re­
cycling was inconvenient.
Contrary to our expectations, validation did not appeal' 
to increase positive cognitive elaboration of the message 
that recycling took "only 30 seconds” . If anything, the 
mean number of cognitions was in the opposite direction, 
though the differences were not significant. Compared to 
the validate-"important” sign, the validate-"30 seconds 
sign” yielded a comparable rate of recycling, but relatively 
few bolstering cognitions. In sum, the "30 second” message 
produced mixed results, and seems to be operating not as a 
weak message or as a strong one, but somewhere in be­
tween, much like its impact in Experiment 1. Although this 
counterargument was accurate (the travel time from most 
classrooms was actually less than 30 sec), it may be that it 
operated as a moderately persuasive message because it did 
not adequately address students’ broader complaints about 
recycling’s inconvenience (going out of their way, using a 
physically difficult can crusher). For soda drinkers who had 
personal experience with the array of inconveniences, "it 
only takes 30 seconds” may have seemed quite limited as a 
persuasive message even though it had seemed persuasive 
to students doing the prescaling. To further explore valida­
tion’ s potential as a way of increasing message scrutiny, we 
conducted a third experiment that used the standard 
ELM -HSM  weak-strong paradigm for demonstrating that a 
manipulation can increase message scrutiny.
EXPERIMENTS
The purposes of the experiment were to examine whether 
clinical validation served to increase scrutiny, cognitive
D is c u s s io n
CONVHNIHNCH, PHRSUASION, AND RECYCLING 1 9 5
elaboration, and behavior change, and whether cognitive 
elaboration was linked to behavioral maintenance (continued 
behavior with the message removed). A typical technique in 
the ELM and HSM traditions for determining whether a ma­
nipulation increases scrutiny is to couple the manipulation of 
interest with two different messages. The messages advocate 
the same position, but one is composed of cogent arguments 
(strong) and the other is composed of specious yet plausible 
arguments (weak). The expected pattern is that left 
unscrutinized (peripheral route or heuristic processing), 
weak and strong messages are equally effective, but under 
scrutiny (central route or systematic processing), the strong 
message is influential but the weak message is undermined 
and rejected (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, 1984; Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; see Petty & Cacioppo, 1981 or 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for reviews).
Experiment 3 had three components, each addressing the 
question of whether validation increases message scrutiny. 
If validation is effective (a) nonvalidated weak and strong 
messages should not differ in behavioral impact, attitude 
change, or positive cognitive elaboration; (b) the validated 
strong message should be more effective than the weak one 
in behavioral impact, attitude change, and positive elabora­
tion; and (c) positive cognitive elaboration should translate 
into more enduring behavior change, that is, behavioral 
maintenance with the signs removed. Thus, changes based 
on a peripheral route should not be sustained, but those 
based on a central route should be.
Method 
Experim ental Design, M anipulations, 
a n d  Data Collection P rocedures
The design was a 2 (Validation: no-yes) x 2 (Message: weak, 
“it is the 90s”, strong, “It is important”) x 3 (Time: base­
line-treatment-follow-up) between and within participants 
factorial. The methodology (e.g., choice of buildings, data 
collection, questionnaire administration) replicated that of 
Experiment 2. To avoid habituation to the signs and increase 
chances that students would read them, data were gathered 
more than 6 months after Experiment 2. This 6-month inter­
val would also allay concerns about carryover effects.
The unsigned, baseline period lasted for 2 weeks, the 
treatment for 3 weeks, the signs were removed, and the fol­
low-up lasted for 1 week after a 1-week delay. During 
treatment, bright yellow signs on each wastebasket in every 
classroom in these buildings said “No aluminum cans, 
please” and directed students to that building's recycling 
container. The final sentence, at the bottom of the sign, 
contained the validation and message manipulations. Recy­
cling bins were located so as to produce a moderate level of 
convenience, except for the validation-im portant” condi­
tion, which was in a building with an inconvenient location.
To verify that students perceived differences between the 
two messages (without validation), they were embedded in a 
list of similar messages and rated by 50 psychology students in 
a different quarter (their classroom was in one of our experi­
mental buildings and at the time the recycling container was in 
place, but there were no signs about recycling). Students re­
ceived extra course credit for their participation. They were 
told to imagine that they had an aluminum can and were about 
to discard it when they saw a sign encouraging them to recycle 
it. All students rated their reactions to 9 different messages on 
two different scales. On a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (/ 
would definitely toss) to 5 (I would definitely recycle), the 
mean for “it is important” was 3.36 and that for “it is the 90s” 
was 2.82, repeated measures F( 1,48) = 8.61, MSE = 0.81, p < 
.005, partial r |2 = .15. On a scale ranging from 1 {extremely 
negative influence [on my opinion about recycling the can]) to 
5 (extremely positive influence), the mean for the “important” 
sign was 3.47 and for the “90s” sign, 2.39, F( 1,47) = 44.93, 
MSE=0.65,p  < .001, partialr|2 = .49. Note that the ratings span 
the midpoint, being in the positive range for the “important” 
sign and in the negative range for the “90s” sign. A key idea in 
ELM -HSM  research is that the weak message should be rea­
sonable if given a cursory glance. Ratings of the weak message 
are below but not too far from the neutral point on the scale, 
thereby satisfying this guideline.
As a further check on how the signs might be interpreted, 
each sign was then analyzed closely by half of the students: 
“What do you think the author of this sign had in mind in say­
ing ‘it is the 90s' ?”(« = 23; n = 27 for the “it is important” mes­
sage). Fourteen of the students focusing on the “it is the 90s” 
sign (61%) made a serious interpretation, saying in essence 
that the author used it as a reminder we are running out of time 
if we are to conserve adequate levels of resources; 8 students 
(35%) interpreted it to mean that recycling is modern or hip, 
and one gave no answer. The 27 students asked to review the 
“important” sign made a variety of comments, all sharing the 
general theme that its author was genuinely concerned about 
conservation of resources.
When asked if they would use the sign to encourage re­
cycling, students were lukewarm about both messages. Of 
the students asked to focus on the “it is the 90s” sign, only
7 (30%) said maybe or yes. Eight o f the students who said 
no explicitly said it was too flip or faddish. O f the students 
assigned to focus on the “it is important” sign, a slightly 
higher percentage, 52%, said maybe or yes. The difference 
between the groups is not significant, X2(2, N = 50) = 2.17, 
p > .05. For both groups, the dominant reason for declining 
to use the sign was that they preferred to use a message that 
gave concrete reasons about the benefits of recycling.
R ecycling  Data Collection a n d  A nalysis
Five students counted aluminum cans in trash cans, left on or 
under desks, and in the recycling bins. Accuracy in counting
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was stressed, and data collectors expected their counts to be 
checked on a random basis. Reliability data collected by dif­
ferent pairs of data collectors on six occasions during the 
study yielded reliability coefficients (simple rs) between .97 
and .99; across the entire reliability data set, the reliability 
coefficient was .99, indicating high correspondence between 
data collectors.
Cognitive R e sp o n se  Q uestionnaire
Questionnaires were administered the Monday after signs 
were removed, before the delayed follow-up period. The 
questionnaire opened with a general question about recycling 
motivations designed to apply to both the weak and strong 
messages: “Why do people recycle aluminum cans in this 
building? List as many reasons as you can.” In accord with 
our interest in encouraging recycling, we did not ask people 
to rehearse reasons for not recycling: thus, we did not explic­
itly tap negative reasons. In addition, to keep the question­
naire separate from the signs, we did not ask for reactions to 
the signs or make any reference to the contents of the signs. 
The initial general question was followed by the same
7-point questions used in Experiment 2. A scale tapping 
overall convenience of using the crusher was constructed 
from the mean of three items: (a) time to get to crusher, re­
verse scored: (b) ease of use of crusher; and (c) convenience 
to get to crusher (Cronbach's a  =.66).
We chose the questionnaire participants randomly over 
an approximately 2-hr period (each questionnaire was ran­
domly coded 0, 1, or 2, indicating the researcher should se­
lect the next person to pass a point, or wait for 1 or 2 
people to pass that point before approaching a potential 
participant). One or two experimenters administered ques­
tionnaires in each building during the same time period. We 
used the same “please help with a class project'* appeal as 
in Experiment 2, and most students agreed or refused with­
out knowing the topic ofthe questionnaire. Typical reasons 
for refusing were that the student needed to get to class or 
work, or needed to study for an exam.
Participation rates were fairly high except in the build­
ing where the no validation-weak message signs had been. 
Counting both direct and indirect refusals (people who ac­
cepted but did not return the questionnaire), participation 
rates in each building were 51% for no validation-“it is the 
90's,” 81% for validation-“it is the 90's,” 71% for no vali- 
dation-“it important,” and 70% for validation-“it is impor­
tant,” x2(3, N = 328) = 19.36, p  < .001. Follow-up tests 
indicated that the no validation-“it is the 90* s” group was 
significantly below the others (the test compared 51% with 
70%, the smallest between group difference, y}\ 1, N = 173] 
= 6.89, p  < .01, thereby allowing the inference that this 
building differed from the other three). A separate analysis 
indicated that the others did not differ among themselves, 
X2(2, N = 229) = 2.22, p  > .05. Discussion with the research 
assistants (RA) suggested that the differential participation
rates occurred because one of them had not been as aggres­
sive as the others at asking for help with the project (e.g., 
the others made more eye contact, thrust the questionnaire 
at potential participants, & refused to accept no for an an­
swer; whereas the less aggressive RA waited for students to 
agree to participate). As noted previously, most students re­
fused to participate without knowing the content of the 
questionnaire and simply said that they were in a hurry or 
needed to study for an exam. Although the difference is 
disappointing, if the sample is biased, its impact on the re­
sults would be in the direction opposite to predictions. For 
example, if only students having extensive amounts of time 
helped in that cell, the bias would have been toward that 
group taking more time to write out reasons for recycling.
In addition, if only students interested in recycling partici­
pated, the bias would have been that more students in that 
cell could describe reasons for recycling and have favorable 
attitudes toward recycling. That cell was expected to result 
in little message processing, so these hypothetical biases 
would hinder rather than support our predictions.
Responses to the open-ended questions were counted by 
a single rater, with reliability checks provided by four rat­
ers. For all coding, condition codes were removed and the 
conditions mixed together to eliminate possible biases. Def­
initions were the same as in Experiment 2. A new category 
was created to accommodate playful or facetious reasons. 
These tended to make fun ofthe process (“they need the 
exercise of walking to the crusher;” “mom said so”), or ap­
peared irrelevant to the issue (e.g., “because ofthe build­
ing's architectural integrity and beauty;” “they hate the 
random blinking of the cosmos just before it fails”). There 
were no treatment effects on this measure, these analyses 
are not reported, and facetious answers were not included 
in response counts. Reliability coefficients on the number 
of positive reasons ranged from rs of .86 to .97, with an 
overall reliability of .94. Only one additional rater checked 
for playful or facetious reasons; there were no disagree­
ments between the main and reliability rater's judgments.
The open-ended reasons for recycling were coded into 
the strong, external, and weak categories, as in Experiment 
2. One person categorized all responses into these three cat­
egories, and a second categorized a randomly selected 25%. 
Kappa coefficients on these ratings were 1.00 for the 
“strong environmental” reasons, .91 for the “weak environ­
mental” reasons (96% agreement), and .81 for the external 
reasons (91% agreement).5
Results (including reliabilities) are discussed for only 
participants having a class or office in the building (to as­
sure adequate opportunity for exposure to our signs) and
5There was little overlap among these items. Lxaminadon of the residual 
correlation matrix (with “number o f reasons" representing the open-ended 
responses and the 3-item “convenience" scale representing recycling conve­
nience) indicated that rs(59) ranged from .00 to .18.
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only those who reported drinking sodas at least occasion­
ally (to assure we were considering the cognitions of peo­
ple actually engaging in the behaviors of not recycling or 
recycling). Results based on all participants are similar, and 
are available from the first author. In the reduced sample, 
40% of the participants were female.
line in Experiment 1, the period before we began using signs 
to encourage recycling. Building information is provided in 
Table 4. Random assignment led to one sign (no valida­
tion-important”) being used in the same building in both 
Experiments 2 and 3.
M em ory T est for S igns
One week after the final follow-up period, we revisited the ex­
perimental buildings and administered a short quiz to a ran­
dom sample of students who, when asked, said they previously 
had a class in the building. We first assured them they would 
only be asked to answer “two quick questions” so that refusals 
were unrelated to our issue. We then informed them that we 
had placed signs on the garbage cans, encouraging aluminum 
can recycling. We showed them the first part of the sign (“No 
aluminum cans please!!! Use the recycler located [location 
given]”), and asked what the final sentence had been. When 
they had written an answer—including “don’t know”—we 
turned the paper over to show the same question in multiple 
choice format. All four actual messages were in the list, along 
with four distractors (“funds support the library,” “Support 
ASUU [student government],” “It’s the thing to do,”and “We 
appreciate your help”). Participation rates were high, although 
the no validation-“important” building’s rate was lower than 
the others (no validation-“90s” = 97%; no validation-“impor- 
tant” = 74%; validation-“90s” = 94%; validation-“impor- 
tant” = 94%, x2(3) = 11.48, p < .01).
R esults 
Carryover From E xperim ent 2
Overall recycling during the baseline period was 40.4%, or 
slightly higher than the mean of 37.6% obtained during base­
C h anges in R ecycling  O ver Time
The purposes of the first analysis were to determine 
whether the signs increased recycling above baseline, and 
which changes were maintained after the signs had been re­
moved. A 2 (Validation) x 2 (Message strength) x 3 (Time: 
Baseline-Signs-Signs removed) factorial ANOVA was un­
dertaken on recycling. There was an overall main effect for 
time, F(2, 102) = 31.62, MSE = 100.65, p < .001, partial r|2 
= .38. A significant three-way interaction indicated that re­
cycling rates changed differentially over time, F(2, 102) = 
4.63, M SE = 100.65, p < .01, partial r |2 = .08. A priori 
one-tailed t tests were used within each validation-message 
group to test for changes between the different periods. As 
expected, relative to baseline, when signs were in place, all 
but the validation-weak message (“It may be inconvenient, 
but it is the 90s”) yielded a significant increase in recycling 
(see Table 4).
With respect to maintaining the change, a comparison of 
recycling with signs in place and after their removal revealed a 
pattern almost perfectly consistent with ELM-HSM theoriz­
ing. The validation-“important” (scrutinized strong) sign 
yielded sustained behavior change; in contrast, the no valida­
tion-important” group (no scrutiny, strong) showed the ex­
pected significant drop (Table 4, column 2 vs. column 3). Also 
as expected, the validation-“90s” group (scrutinized weak) 
never improved. The single surprise was that the no valida- 
tion-“90s” group maintained its behavior change during the 
follow-up period.
TABLE 4





Signs Removed (1 week, 
after 1 week delay)
No validation (no expected scrutiny)
W eak “9 0 's" 40% 60%, 61%, (n = 1 1 )“
Strong “important" 37% 56%a 49%'h (n = 20)h
Validation (expect scrutiny)
W eak “9 0 's" 41%. 44%. 44% (n = 16 T
Strong “important" 43%- 61%.„ 60%a (n = 8)d
Note. Data are percentage o f cans recycled, unadjusted scores. Significant changes between 
baseline and signs, and betw'een signs and signs removed are indicated by subscripts within each 
row>, p  < .05. M eans w'ith a common subscript do not differ.
"Condition in i;2: validation-im portant". C ondition  in i;2: no validation-im portant." 
C ondition  in i;2: no validation-“30 seconds." C ondition  in i;2: validation-“30 seconds"; this w>as 
the “ inconvenient" building from Lxperiment 1, a situation we could not change for this 
experiment.
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Treatm ent E ffects: Recycling, M essa g e  
Scrutiny, a n d  Cognitive Elaboration
T reatm ents a n d  recycling with s ig n s in p lace. Be­
cause of significant differences in recycling during baseline, a 
covariance analysis was used to compare the different mes­
sages. The covariate contributed significant variance, F( 1,
50) = 61.34, MSE= 253.68,p < .001, partial r |2 = .55, and was 
homogeneous across the different treatment conditions, both 
time 2 and time 3 covariate by treatment interaction Fs (3,47)
< .97, MSEs < 242.70, ps > .05, partial r |2s < .06. None of the 
effects involving time (signs in place vs. signs removed) was 
significant. Instead, a significant overall validation by mes­
sage interaction emerged, F( 1,50) = 10.65, MSE = 253.68, p
< .002, partial r\z =. 18. However, to test for hypothesized ef­
fects separately for signs and follow-up (treatment differ­
ences with signs in place, and the differential fol­
low-through), a priori t tests for disparate «s were used within 
each time period.
When signs were in place, recycling rates adjusted for 
the covariate (baseline) were consistent with ELM and 
HSM research on peripheral versus central route influence 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, 1984). Absent validation, the 
weak (59.7%) and strong (57.9%) message groups did not 
differ in recycling levels, p > .05. In contrast and as ex­
pected under central route processing, the two validation 
groups differed, with the strong message condition yielding 
significantly higher recycling (58%) than the weak message 
group (43%), p<  .05.
Q uestionnaire
The questionnaire measuring attitudes and cognitive re­
sponses was administered in between the treatment and fol­
low-up periods, early during the 1-week delay. This placed it 
close to the previous week, and it is probably abetter indicator 
of thoughts during the final treatment week than of the subse­
quent follow-up period. As another caveat, it is more accurate 
to compare cognitions with the raw recycling rates because 
those are the behaviors students would explain. In this experi­
ment, the adjustments for the covariate are minimal and do not 
change the patterns of results, so for convenience we discuss 
cognitions in the context of the adjusted scores.
Cognitive elaboration. The first two hypotheses ad­
dressed cognitive responses and proposed that behavioral 
change induced via a peripheral route would be less bolstered 
by supportive cognitions; whereas behaviors resulting via a 
central route with thoughtful analyses of the message would 
have more bolstering cognitions. These hypotheses received 
considerable support, number of reasons, interaction, F( 1, 
81) = 1M ,M SE  = 1.49, p < .01, partial r |2 = .08, and percent­
age giving any reason, interaction F ( l , 81) = 4.12, MSE =
0.22, p < .05, partial r)2 = .05. Consistent with the recycling 
data, students who had seen the validation-im portant” mes­
sage for several weeks provided more positive reasons (M = 
2.00, n = 15) and had a higher percentage giving at least one 
positive reason for recycling (87%) than its validation-“90s” 
counterpart (M = 1.09, n = 23; 61% ,/» < .05). The two no vali­
dation groups differed in the number of reasons provided 
(weak, M = 1.53, n = 19; strong, M = 1.00, n = 28, p < .05) but 
not in the proportion providing any reasons (weak, 74%; 
strong, 57%, p > .05).
Although we thought the validation-im portant” sign 
might stimulate more serious thinking about recycling, 
analysis of the contents of students’ reasons for recycling 
yielded no interaction among type, validation, and message 
strength, F(2, 162) = 2.02, MSE = 0.20, p > .05, partial r |2 = 
.02. Instead, a single significant main effect for type indi­
cated that in all four sign conditions, only a small percent­
age of participants provided strong reasons (15%), slightly 
more than one-third provided external reasons (37%), and 
almost half provided simple environmental reasons, such as 
“for the environment” (45%), F(2, 162) = 8.25, MSE =
0.20, p < .  001, partial r |2 = .09.
Attitudes. The attitude measure should parallel the 
cognitive responses. Analyses revealed a marginally signifi­
cant interaction between validation and message strength, in­
teraction F(l,  79) = 3 .19,MSE = 2.56,p < .08, partial r |2 = .04. 
An a priori, one-tailed, protected t test with a  set at .10 indi­
cated the validation-strong group was more favorable toward 
recycling (M = 5.93, n = 15, on a 7-point scale) than the vali­
dation-weak group (M = 5.23, n = 22). Attitudes of the two no 
validation groups did not differ (weak, M = 5.95, n = 19; 
strong, M = 5.37, n = 27, p > .10).
E m ergen t recycling ethos. Participants’ estimates of 
what percentage of people in their building recycled alumi­
num cans ranged from 29% to 46%. A main effect for mes­
sage indicated that people in the buildings with the “it is the 
90’s” signs believed there was more recycling in their build­
ings (44% of the people were thought to recycle, n = 39) com­
pared to participants in buildings with the “it is important” 
sign (36%, n = 34), F ( l, 69) = 3.88, MSE = 388.15, p < .05, 
partial r)2 = .05. These perceptions were not consistent with 
actual recycling rates or with respondents’ other attitudes and 
cognitions toward recycling. There were no other significant 
effects, validation and message by validation Fs(l,  69) < 
1.91, MSE = 388.15, ps > .10, partial n 2s ^  -03.
P erce ived  inconvenience. There was no evidence 
that validating students’ complaints about inconvenience in­
creased their perceptions of inconvenience. There were no 
significant effects on the scale constructed from items tap­
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ping how long it took to get to the can crusher, how conve­
nient it was to get there, or how easy it was to use the crusher, 
the main and interactive Fs( 1, 74) < 0.77, MSE = 2.73, ps > 
.05, partial r |2s < .01.
Recycling: Treatm ent E ffec ts A fter S ig n s  
h a d  B een  R e m o v e d
During follow-up, after the signs had been removed for 1 
week, treatments yielded both expected and unexpected re­
sults. The analyses of adjusted means essentially echo the re­
peated measures analysis reported previously. Consistent 
with ELM- and HSM-based theorizing, the group with the 
strongest cognitions maintained a high recycling level. That 
is, the validation-'im portant” sign was hypothesized to elicit 
the most positive scrutiny and indeed provided more 
cognitions on the questionnaire. During follow-up, that 
group recycled more than its counterpart, the validation-“it 
is the 90s” group (57% vs. 42%, p < .05).
The no validalion-“il is the 90s” group also recycled at a 
high rate after the signs had been removed (61 %). They recy­
cled significantly more than their counterpart, the no valida­
tion-im portan t” message group (51%, p < .05) and at the 
same rate as the validalion-“il is important” group (57%). 
Thus, although that sign was expected to produce only 
short-term recycling, it appears to have produced sustained re­
cycling, an intriguing puzzle we address in the discussion.
M em ory for S ig n s
The memory test administered 1 week after the follow-up re­
cycling period indicated that people had little memory for de­
tails of our signs. In the recall test of 114 interviewees, only 1 
stated that building’s sign correctly, 4 wrote partially correct 
answers, and the rest wrote that they did not know (although 
many said spontaneously they remembered that there had 
been signs). These data were not analyzed.
Even in the easier multiple choice format, only 11% se­
lected the correct sign for their building, and most se­
lected one of the distractor answers (“We appreciate your 
help” received most endorsements, 31, or 27%). There 
was an interesting pattern, in that the signs with the high­
est recycling rates during follow-up produced the highest 
percentages of correct answers: no validation-“90s”had 
14% correct; validation-“important” had 17% correct; and 
the two remaining groups each had 7% correct; interaction 
F (l, 110) = 2.12^ MSE = 0.10, p < .15, partial i f  = .02. 
Although it makes sense that the more highly scrutinized 
sign would yield better recognition memory, cognitive re­
sponse researchers do not require such an outcome. They 
propose instead that people have better memories for their 
own thoughts about a message than about the message it­
self (Greenwald, 1968; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Thus, 
the low rates of accuracy in the memory test are accept­
able within ELM theory. The differential accuracy is in­
triguing because it suggests that different levels of 
scrutiny did occur.
Discussion
The total pattern of results provides support for ELM -HSM  
and validation-derived hypotheses, whether considering un­
adjusted recycling rates over time, treatment effects adjusted 
for baseline, or behaviors after signs had been removed. The 
general pattern is clear, and supports hypotheses that valida­
tion would increase message scrutiny that would stimulate 
behavior when coupled with a strong message (“it is impor­
tant”), but yield rejection when coupled with a weak message 
(“it is the 90s”). Indeed, with respect to the validation-weak 
message, recycling (unadjusted) never exceeded baseline 
levels. Consistent with hypotheses, compared to the valida­
tion-weak message group, the validation-strong group pro­
vided more cognitions in support of its behavior, had a higher 
proportion of respondents providing a reason, and main­
tained a high level of recycling after signs were re­
moved— even though the recycler was in an inconvenient lo­
cation. They also had stronger attitudes and better 
recognition memory for the sign, although these effects were 
marginally significant. The results support theorizing that 
cognitive elaboration of a message makes the attitude and its 
bolstering cognitions more accessible, and this accessibility 
increases the correspondence between attitudes and behavior 
even after the message has been removed (Petty et al., 1995; 
Rennier, 1988).
An intriguing pattern emerged in the nonvalidated-weak 
message condition. As expected under peripheral route in­
fluence, this group increased its recycling when the signs 
were in place. However, consistent with central route pro­
cessing, they provided more reasons for recycling, main­
tained recycling during the follow-up, and had relatively 
good memory for the posted signs. This group also had the 
most positive attitudes, although this measure was not sig­
nificantly higher than the comparison group (the no 
validation-strong message group).
One explanation for the behavioral maintenance in this 
group is that some students spontaneously scrutinized the 
nonvalidated-“90s” message and were able to generate a 
serious interpretation. Indeed, recall that 61% of the 
prescaling students who focused on the “90s” sign had gen­
erated a serious interpretation, especially that “we are run­
ning out of time to preserve resources.” In contrast to the 
validated-weak message, which invited scrutiny and led to 
rejection, this gradual, spontaneous scrutiny may have led 
to serious interpretations, especially if students already fa­
vored recycling. The relatively high number of reasons for 
recycling and better memory for the sign 3 weeks after
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signs had been removed supports our speculation that some 
students had spontaneously scrutinized the weak message.
If they figured out a serious interpretation, it could have led 
to its more enduring impact. Possibly, had we measured 
cognitions late in the follow-up period, we would have de­
tected this effect in the content analysis. The intriguing pat­
tern of results has led us to consider using “provocative” 
signs as a strategy for increasing elaboration in future stud­
ies, much as rhetorical questions can increase elaboration 
(Petty, C.acioppo, & Heesacker, 1981). As a final point, this 
group had the lowest survey participation rate, a potential 
source of bias. However, the correspondence between recy­
cling rates and cognitive measures on the questionnaire 
mitigates concerns about a biased sample in this building. 
Their participation rate in the follow-up memory test was 
high and similar to the others, reducing concerns about bias 
for that measure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across the 3 experiments, one effect is quite robust: Effec­
tive signs increased recycling over baseline. The single ex­
ception was in Experiment 2, when the increase was margin­
ally significant, possibly because the high base rate made a 
significant increase difficult to achieve. The first experiment 
also suggests that effective signs can encourage recycling de­
spite some inconvenience, thereby potentially reducing the 
costs of recycling programs.
Another pattern that emerged is that validation appeared 
to have the desired impact of increasing message scrutiny. 
In Experiment 2, the validation-important” message group 
generated more reasons for recycling than the other groups. 
In Experiment 3, that same sign again yielded a higher 
level of cognitive elaboration than its validated-weak coun­
terpart. This strategy may be an important complement to 
other strategies known to increase cognitive elaboration, es­
pecially in field research, where more traditional methods 
cannot be implemented or would be impractical (although a 
sign highlighting the reader’s vested interest might suffice 
[Crano, 1995] as might a sign using a rhetorical questions 
[Petty, C.acioppo, & Heesacker, 1981]). Along these lines, 
it is useful that validating complaints of inconvenience did 
not raise perceptions of inconvenience, nor did it lead peo­
ple to downplay the levels of inconvenience. Perceived lack 
of convenience may have been a barrier that people were 
willing to get around once they elaborated the prorecycling 
message, and made salient and accessible their own preex­
isting prorecycling attitudes. We imagine a minibattle 
played out in students’ heads, in which they eventually con­
vince themselves that it’s more important to recycle than to 
worry about inconvenience. This minibattle was stimulated 
by a sign that acknowledged their complaint but encour­
aged them to think about it.
Future research is needed to articulate exactly why vali­
dation might have this effect. For example, does it reduce
reactance and restore the recipient’s sense of control 
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981), set up a demand for reciprocal 
listening (cf. C.ialdini, Green, & Rush, 1992), increase lik­
ing for the communicator, or have some other impact? If it 
can have such effects, validation is akin to C.ialdini’s 
(1993) jujitsu maneuvers. Rather than confronting people 
with stronger and stronger persuasive messages, validation 
may “open the door” and increase their exposure to and 
thoughts about the message. If the message is inherently 
persuasive and appropriate for the situation, it should have 
more influence on attitudes and possibly increase the con­
nection between attitudes and behaviors over the long-term. 
In addition, as we stated at the outset, these signs may be 
most effective in cases where attitudes are already gener­
ally positive. In this milieu, simple signs can strengthen at­
titudes, make them a little more positive, and increase their 
accessibility in ways that may not occur if recipients are ac­
tively hostile toward the message. In theory, the validation 
technique should be effective with a hostile audience, but 
additional effort may be required for effectiveness with 
such a group (e.g., a gradual increase in persuasiveness, 
more comprehensive validation, changing the physical ap­
pearance of the signs to renew attention, etc.).
We have argued that saying “it may be inconvenient” is 
essentially the equivalent of clinical validation, and this 
validation is what produced the increased scrutiny and re­
ceptivity to the signs. ELM and HSM researchers state that 
persons need both the motivation and ability to scrutinize 
messages. However, we have not specified whether valida­
tion influences motivation, ability, or both, and future re­
search is needed to address this. Future research may also 
address an alternative reason for validation’s effectiveness 
in this research: The validating message may have appeared 
to be more polite. So it is not clinical validation but rather 
greater social appropriateness that elicited more attention 
and thought, and greater adherence to the sign’s request. 
Although we agree this is an intriguing possibility, we ex­
pect that the pattern of results would be different if students 
are simply more receptive to polite signs. If polite signs 
make people more helpful or put them in more friendly and 
receptive moods, there should be no interaction (no decre­
ment in the validation-weak message group), but instead 
simple main effects for the validated conditions. It would 
be interesting to compare truly polite signs (varying such 
words as “please,” “thank you,” and “we appreciate your 
help”) with validating signs (acknowledgment of primary 
counterarguments) to see if politeness can also increase 
message scrutiny.
Validating someone’s initial concerns is similar to pre­
senting a two-sided argument, and as such raises the ques­
tion of how much negativity one can validate before 
undermining one’s own persuasive message. For example, 
in our particular message, we pointed out the inconve­
nience but never attempted to undermine generally ac­
cepted reasons for recycling. Had we validated a common
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urban legend about recycling that “this material may not 
actually be reused, but it’s important to try anyhow,” we 
might have undermined our persuasive intent. Thus, any 
negative arguments acknowledged with a validation would 
need to be offset by more positive or more heavily 
weighted arguments generated by the recipient or provided 
by the communicator. Indeed, this is exactly the strategy 
used by clinicians in their validation therapy. For example, 
family therapists only legitimate their clients’ affective re­
actions, not their cognitive interpretations (Alexander & 
Parsons, 1982). Similarly, Kraus and Redman (1986) im­
plicitly suggest to clients that although their reasons for be­
ing depressed are legitimate, those reasons are less 
important and less serious than the negative consequences 
of their depression. Similarly, no matter how nice and vali­
dating a customer service representative is, if a serious 
problem cannot be remediated, the customer will probably 
not be fully satisfied. Furthermore, it may be important to 
use validation early on, but over time, begin to minimize 
the significance of the initial complaint in concert with its 
reduced relevance to those in the setting. Future research 
could define the parameters of effective validation and 
demonstrate the underlying atlitudinal processes involved.
There are several caveats involving this line of research. 
First, as noted earlier, treatment is confounded with build­
ing in every experiment, and there may be dependencies 
among the classrooms (students with multiple classes in the 
same building; observations of others’ behaviors). Al­
though we used several methodological techniques for re­
ducing the severity of this problem (random assignment to 
building, use of baseline data, evidence in every building of 
a wide variety of course topics and by implication types of 
students, mostly similar refusal rates in the questionnaire 
studies), we would have preferred to use several buildings 
per treatment, but suitable buildings were not available. 
Another problem is that aluminum cans were left in the 
wastebaskets, and could potentially have contributed to 
treatment effects (visible cans could have induced more 
people to discard rather than recycle; lack of visible cans 
could have induced more to recycle). We have no record of 
how visible the cans were in the trash container (we know 
they were sometimes visible & sometimes hidden by other 
garbage), but this would be useful data to collect in future 
research. In addition, of course, we have no measures of the 
extent to which seeing cans or no cans influenced others’ 
behavior, although that would also be a useful experiment. 
Another problem of field research is that we have no con­
trol over exposure to the sign, whereas in a laboratory, one 
knows that a participant has read a message. This is simply 
not the case in field research, and we must hope that initial 
reading rates were similar across the buildings (although of 
course, we expected differential message scrutiny). Al­
though we used strategies for drawing representative sam­
ples and focused on participants who spent time in the 
building (Experiments 2 & 3) and used aluminum cans (Ex­
periment 3), we still needed to infer a connection between 
questionnaire responses and behavior. On the other hand, 
there is a long and distinguished literature on the need to 
use both laboratory and field research to gain true under­
standings of behavior. So we are not apologizing for our 
choice of methodology, but simply acknowledging the need 
for future research in both field and laboratory that clarifies 
and extends our findings.
In conclusion, this research has contributed to theoreti­
cal perspectives on persuasion and added to the growing 
body of literature on recycling. The experiments show that 
simple, well-designed signs can influence behavior while 
the signs are in place as well as after their removal, as long 
as people are generally favorable toward the behavior. It 
also shows the utility of combining ideas about validation, 
scrutiny, and accessibility to studying attitude and behavior 
processes. It contributes to the body of research aimed at 
understanding recycling and other positive environmental 
behaviors (Burn & Oskamp, 1986; DeYoung, 1993; 
Guagano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995; Stern & Oskamp, 1987), 
being unusual in using persuasive messages rather than 
prompts or simple instructional signs. It supports the idea 
that there is no simple trick for changing behaviors, but that 
messages from multiple sources are needed (Werner, 1999; 
Werner & Adams, 2001; Werner, Rhodes, & Partain,
1998). That is, the high attitude scores suggest that these 
students came to the situation with prorecycling attitudes, 
learned in another setting, such as in high school, at home, 
or in the media. Our signs served to make these attitudes 
more salient and—after elaboration—more accessible. The 
relative convenience of the bins contributed an additional 
source of motivation to recycle. We suspect that, to be opti­
mally effective, behavior change interventions need to ad­
dress these multiple levels.
ACNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Garth Peterson, Director of the University’s Custo­
dial Services, without whose cooperation this work would 
have been impossible. We also thank Bert Uchino and Carol 
Sansone for their very helpful comments in designing this re­
search and for their extensive comments on previous ver­
sions of the article. David Sanbonmatsu, Frederick 
Rhodewalt, Steven Posavac, and David Feick also provided 
very helpful comments on the draft article. Finally, we ex­
tend our appreciation to Carl Brown, Alexandra Gericke, 
James Isaac, Eeva Makela, David Feick, Steven Posavac, 
Kim Reed, Raghu Shatligar, Jessi Smith, and Michael 
Tragakis for their assistance in data collection.
REFERENCES
Alexander, J. !•'.,& Parsons, B. V.l 1982). Functional family therapy: Under­
standing the principles o f  fam ily  functioning. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks-Cole.
202 WBRNBR, STOLL, BIRCH, WHITB
Blodgett, J, G., Granbois, D, H,, & Walters, R. G. (1993). The effects o f per­
ceived justice on complainants’ negative word-of-mouth behavior and 
repatronage intentions. Journal o f  Retailing, 69, 399-428.
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory o f 
freedom and control. New York: Academic.
Brock, T. C. (1967). Communication discrepancy and intent to persuade as 
determinants o f  counterargument production. Journal o f Experimental 
Social Psychology, 3, 296-309.
Bruning, J. L„ & Kintz, B. L. (1987). Computational handbook o f statistics, 
(3rd ed.). Glenview, IL: HarperCollins.
Burn, S. M,, & Oskamp, S. (1986). Increasing community recycling with per­
suasive communication and public commitment. Journal o f  Applied So­
cial Psychology, 16,2 9 -4 1 .
Chaiken, S. (1987). The heuristic model o f persuasion. In M. P. Zanna, J. M. 
Olson, & C. P. Herm an (Eds.), Social influence: The Ontario Symposium 
(Vol. 5, pp. 3-39). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Influence: Science and practice (3rd ed.). New York: 
HarperCollins.
Cialdini, R. B,, Green, B. L„ & Rush, A. J. (1992). When tactical pronounce­
ments o f  change become real change: The case o f  reciprocal persuasion. 
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 357-404.
Coates, D ,, & Wortman, C. B. (1980). Depression maintenance and interper­
sonal control. In A. Baum & J, E. Singer (Eds.), Advances in environmen­
tal psychology, Vol. 2: Applications o f personal control (pp. 149-182). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Coy ne, J. C. (1985). Toward a theory o f frames and reframing: The social na­
ture o f  frames. Journal o f  Marital and Family Therapy, I I ,  337-344.
Crano, W. D. (1995). Attitude strength and vested interest. In R. E. Petty & J. 
A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences 
(pp. 131-158). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
DeYoung, R. (1993). Changing behavior and making it stick: The conceptu­
alization and management o f  conservation behavior. Environment and 
Behavior, 25, 485-505.
Eagly, A . H., & Chaiken, S. (Eds.). (1993). The psychology; o f attitudes. Or­
lando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College.
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: 
The M ODE model as an integrative framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Ad­
vances in experimental social psychology; (Vol. 23, pp. 75-109). New 
York: Academic.
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determi­
nants, consequences, and correlates o f  attitude accessibility. In R. E. 
Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Angecedents and con­
sequences (pp. 247-282). M ahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc.
Furlong, C. B. (1993). There’s life after blunders. Canadian Banker, 100, 
10-13.
Geller, E. S., W inett, R. A ., & Everett, P. B . (Eds.). (1982). Preserving the en­
vironment: New strategies fo r  behavior change. New York: Pergamon,
Gottman, J. M. (1979). Marital interaction: Experimental investigations. 
New York: Academic.
Greenwald, A. G. (1968). Cognitive learning, cognitive response to persua­
sion, and attitude change. In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, & T. M. 
Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological foundations o f attitudes (pp. 147-170). 
New York: Academic.
Guagnano, G. A., Stern, P. C „ & Dietz, T. (1995). Influences on attitude-be- 
havior relationships: A  natural experiment with curbside recycling. Envi­
ronment and Behavior, 27, 699-718.
Hatfield, A. B. (1987). Coping and adaptation: A  conceptual framework 
for understanding families. In A. B. Hatfield & H. P. Lefley (Eds.), 
Families o f the mentally ill: Coping and adaptation (pp. 60-84). New 
York: Guilford.
Hormuth, S. E., Katzenstein, H„ Bruch, B,, & Ringenberger, B. (1993). Psy­
chological studies on garbage avoidance and recycling. In J. 
Urbina-Soria, P. Ortega-Andeane, & R. Bechtel (Eds.), EDRA 21 pro­
ceedings: Healthy environments. Oaxtepec, Morelos, Mexico, March, 
1991 (pp. 32,1-325). Oklahoma City, OK: EDRA.
Johnson, B. T„ & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Effects o f  involvement on persuasion: 
A  meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 290-314.
Johnson, B. T„ & Eagly, A. H. (1990). Involvement and persuasion: Types, 
traditions, and the evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 375-384.
Kelley, B. (1993, January). Customer service: Reality check. Sales and Mar­
keting Management, 145, 50-53.
Kraus, M. A ., & Redman, E. S. (1986). Postpartum depression: An 
interactional view. Journal o f  Marital and Family Therapy, 12(1), 63-74.
Langer, E„ Blank, A., & Chanowitz, B. (1978). The mindlessness of ostensi­
bly thoughtful action. Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 
635-642.
McGuire, W. J. (1964). Inducing resistance to persuasion: Some contempo­
rary approaches. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 191-229). New York: Academic.
Petty, R. E. (1994). Two routes to persuasion: State o f the art. In G. 
d’Ydewalle, P. Eelen, & P. Berteleson (Eds.), International perspectives 
on psychological science (Vol. 2, pp. 229-247). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979a). Effects o f  forewarning o f persuasive 
intent and involvement on cognitive responses and persuasion. Personal­
ity^  and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, 173-176.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979b). Issue involvement can increase or de­
crease persuasion by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. 
Journal o f Personality and Socicd Psychologyt, 37, 1915-1926.
Petty, R. E„ & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and 
contemporary approaches. Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects o f  involvement on re­
sponses to argument quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to 
persuas ion. Journal o f Personality and Socicd Psychology, 46, 69—81.
Petty, R. E„ & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986a). The elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion. In  L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psy­
chology (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205). Orlando, FL: Academic.
Petty, R. E„ & Cacioppo, J. T. (Eds.). (1986b). Communication and persua­
sion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: 
Springer-Verlag.
Petty, R. E,, & Cacioppo, J. T. (1990). Involvement and persuasion: Tradi­
tion versus integration. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 367-374.
Petty, R. E„ Cacioppo, J. T ., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as 
a determinant o f  argument-based persuasion. Journal o f Personality? and 
Social Psychology, 41, 847-855.
Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Heesacker, M. (1981). Effects o f  rhetorical 
questions on persuasion: A  cognitive response analysis. Journal o f Per­
sonality? and Social Psychology, 40, 432-440.
Petty, R. E., Haugvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a deter­
minant o f attitude strength: Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, 
and predictive o f behavior. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude 
strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 93-130). M ahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Petty, R. E„ Wells, G. L„ & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or 
reduce yielding to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justifica­
tion. Journal o f  Personality? and Socicd Psychology, 34, 874-884.
Rennier, G. A. (1988). The strength ofthe object-evaluation association, the 
attitude-behavior relationship and the elaboration likelihood model o f 
persuasion. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University o f Missouri, 
Columbia.
Rogers, C. (1951). Client-centered therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Stern, P. C., & Oskamp, S. (1987). Managing scarce environmental re­
sources. In  D. Stokols & I. A ltm an (Eds.), Handbook o f environmental 
psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 1043-1088). New York: Wiley.
W erner, C. M. (1999). Sustainability: Psychological perspectives. In E. 
Becker & T. Jahn (Eds.), Sustainciblity and the socicd sciences: A 
cross-disciplinary approach to integrating environmental considerations 
into theoretical reorientation (pp. 223-242). London: ZED.
W erner, C. M „ & Adams, D. (2001). Changing homeowners’ behaviors with 
toxic household chemicals: A  psychological, multi-level approach. Anal­
yses o f Social Issues and Public Policy, 1, 1-31.
CONVENIENCE, PERSUASION, AND RECYCLING 203
Werner, C. M „ Rhodes, M. U„ & Partain, K. K. (1998). Designing effective 
instructional signs with schema theory: Case studies of polystyrene recy­
cling. Environment and Behavior, 30, 709-735.
White, P. H„ & Harkins, S. G. (1994). Race of source effects in the elabora­
tion likelihood model. Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 
790-807.
Wikler, L„ Wasow>, M „ & Hatfield, E. (1981). Chronic sorrow'revisited: Par­
ent vs. professional depiction of the adjustment of parents o f mentally re­
tarded children. American Journal o f  Orthopsychiatry', 51, 63-70. 
Winer, R. J. (1962). Statistical principles in experimental design. New' York: 
McGraw-Hill.
